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Recommendations
\ Ensure that all sides commit to  
assembling their forces
Force assembly applies to the opposition as much 
as to the SPLA-In Government. The ongoing debate 
in Juba about cantonment, however, only addresses 
the assembly of SPLA-In Opposition. The transitional 
government needs to send a strong signal that it is 
serious about force assembly by moving its troops 
back to the barracks.
\ Avoid long-term programmes linked 
to cantonment
From an economic perspective, resource-intensive, 
long-term programmes linked to cantonment are not 
feasible. These may also have adverse consequences 
from a peace perspective as they encourage new 
armed groups to join the fighting. 
\ Get national consensus on key principles 
in the defence and security transforma-
tion prior to cantonment of forces
Before considering cantonment, it is of utmost 
importance to reach widespread agreement in society 
and parliament on political principles guiding the 
mid-term transformation of the country’s security 
sector (e.g. ethnic inclusion, militia integration and 
professionalization) as these will guide the re-
organization and demobilization of armed forces.   
\ Generate inclusive dialogue on the 
transitional security arrangements  
Since many opposition groups are not represented in the 
current peace process, the cantonment of forces that are 
party to the peace agreement would be of limited effect 
as main conflict drivers are left out. On the contrary, 
the process can even deepen exclusion. To avoid this, 
the High-Level Revitalization Forum needs to generate 
inclusive dialogue with the opposition movements—
even those that are non-signatories to the ARCSS.
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According to the—largely stalled—Agreement on the 
Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) of 2015, 
one key component of the transitional security arrange- 
ments is the establishment of cantonment sites, where 
fighters assemble to await disarmament, demobiliza-
tion or force integration. The cantonment process was 
supposed to start soon after the signing of the agree-
ment, but due to enormous delays in the implementa-
tion of the transitional security arrangements and the 
return of conflict in July 2016, the  process has in reality 
never taken off. The conflict is ongoing and all sides, 
including government forces, continue to use violence 
despite various ceasefire pledges. 
While the Peace Agreement’s rationale for canton-
ment and assembly was to separate the warring fac-
tions to enable a permanent ceasefire, this Policy Brief 
argues that these are mainly viewing cantonment as 
a tool to reach their respective military objectives. 
When opposition leader and by then First Vice  
President of the Transitional Government of National 
Unity (TGoNU) Riek Machar was still in South Sudan, 
he aimed at establishing as many SPLA-In Opposition 
(SPLA-IO) cantonment sites as possible. Today, con-
flict analysts are convinced that Machar intended to 
utilize cantonment as an instrument to strengthen 
his forces and to extend his military power base. 
Taban Deng Gai, who suceeded Machar in 2016, 
aligned himself closely with the SPLA-In Government 
(SPLA-IG) that is now aiming at using cantonment as 
a tool to create a distinction between forces loyal to 
the TGoNU (SPLA-IG & SPLA-IO loyal to Taban Deng 
Gai) and those who have not joined/are not joining 
the peace process, including the SPLA-IO sections 
who are still in support of Machar. The overall objec-
tive of cantonment as envisioned by the government 
is to reunify and strengthen the SPLA through the 
cantonment of forces. 
Due to these highly politicized objectives and the fact 
that ARCSS is dysfunctional in many ways, several 
donors are hesitant to provide support to the imple-
mentation of this particular area of ARCSS. Most re-
cently, the Troika (Norway, the United States, the 
United Kingdom) and the European Union clearly 
stated that they will not continue to indefinitely sup-
port ARCSS implementation activities and institu-
tions if these do not contribute to peace. Furthermore, 
they noted that the security arrangements outlined 
in Chapter II have become obsolete by the evolution 
of the conflict and that these “must be opened for 
limited changes to reflect the current political and 
security context, carefully noting the lessons learnt 
from the agreement’s failure to mitigate violence”1. 
The High-Level Revitalization Forum, a new peace  
initiative recently endorsed by regional leaders to  
revive the stalled peace process, could potentially play 
a major role in this regard. Amongst others, its tasks 
will be to revise the transitional security arrange-
ments, to remove obsolete provisions and to look into 
the articles relating to the cantonment of forces, 
shaping this process into a vehicle for peace. This  
Policy Brief provides some key recommendations in 
this regard. 
How catonment was initially supposed 
to work out
The cantonment process described in the 2015 Peace 
Agreement intended to separate the fighting forces 
and was supposed to be a crucial element in the im-
mediate transition from war to peace and an impor-
tant tool for achieving a permanent ceasefire. The 
warring parties were meant to separate and assemble 
their forces previously in combat within thirty days 
of the signing of the Agreement “to enable personnel, 
weapons and equipment accountability, screening, 
re-organization and/or disarmament and demobili-
zation” (IGAD, 2015). 
Within 90 days of the signing of the Agreement, the 
parties, assisted by international actors like the 
Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (which is 
the predecessor mechanism to the Ceasefire and 
Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring 
Mechanism), the African Union and UNMISS were 
supposed to initiate activities in the assembly sites. 
1 \ Troika/EU Non-paper on the peace process, 2017. Document in the  
possession of the author
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These would range from registration of personnel 
and weapons, screening, and medical treatment  
to confidence-building measures and other disar-
mament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
activities (though these have not been spelled out in 
detail). The Peace Agreement also allowed SPLA-IG 
and SPLA-IO, the two parties to the Peace Agreement, 
to maintain separate identities for eighteen months 
before reunification. Therefore, if, following registra-
tion of combatants, either side had desired to retain 
combatants in cantonment sites, they could have 
potentially done this, but they would have been  
expected to fund all associated costs of sustaining 
those fighters. 
The objective of cantonment, as mentioned in the 
Agreement, is twofold: 1) to stop the fighting by 
placing combat forces from the warring parties in 
fixed positions that can be monitored constantly, 
and, 2) to utilize it as a first step towards disarma-
ment and demobilization and the long-term trans-
formation of South Sudan’s security sector. As con-
cerns the latter aspect, the Agreement binds the 
warring parties to also provide a “complete declara-
tion of personnel and equipment of forces not in 
cantonment […] to the SDSR [Strategic Defence and 
Security Review] Board” (IGAD, 2015). 
If the above processes had been put into action as 
planned, cantonment operations could indeed have 
assisted in implementing the ceasefire and ending 
the conflict. This however, never happened. 
Cantonment as a tool to strengthen  
SPLA-IO’s position
Even though a Joint Military Ceasefire Commission 
(JMCC) was established to plan and oversee canton-
ment operations, the SPLA-IO and SPLA-IG failed to 
agree on the assembly process for a long time after the 
signing of ARCSS. Therefore, cantonment as foreseen 
in ARCSS never started. 
In the months after the signing of ARCSS, both  
factions of the SPLA particularly disagreed on the 
number and location of opposition-nominated can-
tonment sites as well as the eligibility criteria for  
assembly. While the SPLA-IO called for the establish-
ment of cantonment sites in the Bahr el Ghazal and 
Equatoria regions (where it claimed to maintain posi-
tions), the government did not to want to allow oppo-
sition forces to assemble in these areas, arguing that 
SPLA-IO is not entitled to canton troops in locations 
where it had not been present during the crisis. It  
was only on 27 May 2016, after having discussed the 
number and location of cantonment sites in length, 
that the South Sudan’s Council of Ministers finally  
approved the establishment of four assembly areas in 
the Greater Equatoria region and two sites in Bahr el 
Ghazal.
However, disagreements between the government and 
the opposition continued to prevail regarding who 
would be allowed into the cantonment sites. While 
members of the SPLA envisaged a process whereby 
cantonment is restricted to those with weapons (“one 
man, one gun”), this view was not shared by Riek 
Machar. Instead, he depicted a scenario in which com-
manders in the field decide eligibility for cantonment, 
and in which an 18-month cantonment process is also 
open to community defence groups such as the White 
Army. He justified this by stating his belief that, to dis-
arm the general population, cantonment should be 
open to many rather than few (author interview with 
Riek Machar in June 2016). 
Statements like this imply that Machar’s vision at 
that time was to build up his forces and cement the 
presence of armed opposition also in the Greater 
Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal regions. Although 
Machar continued to affirm his strong commitment 
to the peace process publicly, he also had a clear mili-
tary interest in strengthening the position of the 
armed opposition in the country. He considered the 
cantonment exercise a helpful tool in this respect, as 
it offered an opportunity to bring new recruits into 
the opposition. 
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As a consequence, the Joint Military Ceasefire Com-
mission (JMCC) is very keen to formally begin the 
process of cantonment and hence has started to plan 
for concrete action despite increasingly loud calls for 
an overhaul of ARCSS. The parties to the JMCC have 
agreed to start with a cantonment pilot site (camp) at 
Tendere (about 25 km from Juba) targeting SPLA-IO 
forces (loyal to Taban Deng). The government’s idea 
behind this pilot project is that once the process 
starts, other armed actors who would not otherwise 
participate in the cantonment will be inspired to do 
so when they see that the government truly grants 
amnesty and there are benefits to disarmament. 
While the JMCC aims at accelerating the canton-
ment planning, there is, however, little chance that 
the cantonment process will take off anytime soon. 
Much of the country is still in conflict, and there are 
daily clashes between government and opposition 
forces, forcing thousands of South Sudanese to flee 
their homes. There is also growing consensus that 
many ARCSS elements have become obsolete or will 
need to be revised. Given the country’s dire economic 
situation, the transitional government also does not 
have the necessary funds to sustain forces in canton-
ment and implement transition activities at assem-
bly areas over longer time periods. For their part,  
major donors have made it clear that they will not 
support either party logistically in sustaining stand-
ing armies during the transition period, including 
those in cantonment sites. 
The position of the international  
community
Given that much of South Sudan still suffers from  
violent conflict involving government and opposition 
forces, the international support for ARCSS has 
stalled. The donor scepticism towards the envisioned 
cantonment process stems from the fact that the gov-
ernment regards cantonment as a potential tool to 
further marginalize opposition forces not in support 
of the First Vice President Taban Deng. Many interna-
tionals in Juba also critically observe that 
The strategy of the transitional 
government: Separating ‘the good’ 
from ‘the bad’
Machar’s vision of installing a number of cantonment 
sites in the Greater Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal  
region, however, never materialized due to the fresh 
outbreak of violence mid-2016. After three days of 
fighting in Juba, Machar and his forces withdrew 
from the capital; Machar himself fled the country. 
The SPLM-IO leadership that remained in Juba  
endorsed the former Governor of Unity State, Taban 
Deng Gai, to replace Machar, a move that was portrayed 
as a means to revive the Peace Agreement. But, fact is 
that at the time Taban Deng took power, a significant 
part of the SPLA-IO political elite did not support 
him, neither did many of the rank-and-file members 
of the SPLA-IO forces (Small Arms Survey, 2016). 
Despite Taban Deng’s lack of support within the  
opposition, the international community and regional 
actors took a pragmatic decision and approved his  
appointment as First Vice President. The recognition 
of Taban Deng meant that a large part of the opposi-
tion was suddenly outside the political process.  
Currently, of the former warring factions that had 
signed ARCSS, therefore only the SPLA-In Government 
(SPLA-IG) and the section of the opposition controlled 
by Taban Deng (SPLA-IO) remain committed to the 
agreement. Though there continues to be a flow of 
militias and rebels that accept amnesty and join the 
National Dialogue, Taban Deng is still trying to bring 
more armed opposition groups under TGoNU’s 
umbrella. 
Much in line with this attempt to unify the various 
opposition groups, the SPLA-IG—like Riek Machar in 
the past—aims to use the cantonment exercise to  
advance its military and political objectives. Conclud-
ing from discussions taking place at JMCC meetings 
in recent months, the government sees it as a mecha-
nism to separate forces in support of Taban Deng 
from those that are not. 
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While it is indeed necessary to completely overhaul 
Chapter II—and the Troika’s /EU’s suggested course of 
action with regard to the revitalization process and 
support to ARCSS is logical in that respect—the Troika/ 
EU do not give any indication of what can and should 
be done in case the current Peace Agreement cannot 
be revived. Implicitly, the delay in implementing a 
new peace initiative and unwillingness by interna-
tional actors, the South Sudanese government and 
IGAD to consider a post-ARCSS political alternative 
plays into the hands of government forces that are 
pushing for a countrywide military victory. 
How to turn the security  
arrangements into a vehicle for peace
Before planning for cantonment get national  
consensus on key principles in the defence and  
security transformation 
Discussions on the future security arrangements will 
not only need to address the open questions related to 
the cantonment process (first and foremost what 
should be the objective of cantonment in the present 
context) but will also have to deal with what happens 
to ex-combatants once they leave the assembly areas. 
The key question has yet to be answered, namely how 
the cantonment exercise would link up with wider 
security sector reform efforts in South Sudan. 
Cantonment can only be a vehicle for peace if certain 
conditions are met. Most importantly, cantonment 
operations need to assist in developing unified, pro-
fessional, law-abiding and accountable defence forces 
that are reduced to the size required for legitimate  
defence. Releasing all children associated with armed 
forces and groups is a must in this process—and the 
conflict parties must be held to their promises to do 
so. According to UNICEF, more than 17,000 children 
are in the ranks of armed forces and groups in South 
Sudan, with recruitment ongoing. 
government troops are pressing for a country-wide 
military victory, while the TGoNU in Juba is at the 
same time publicly announcing its commitment to 
the implementation of the peace process.  
Opposition forces not in support of Taban Deng con-
tinue to launch attacks in various parts of the country, 
but the SPLA seems to have gained the upper hand 
over the situation as its enemies only control small 
pockets of territory. The current rulers of South Sudan 
have successfully seized the political initiative, and they 
are using this advantage to advance their agenda. 
This, in essence, implies that many donors, including 
the Troika, are cautious about openly supporting or 
closely liaising with the TGNU in matters relating to 
Chapter II, as they fear the negative consequences of 
such an engagement. They do not want to be perceived 
as supporting one side or helping to push the govern-
ment’s agenda. In its speech during the IGAD  
Extra-Ordinary Summit on 12 June 2017 in Addis Ababa, 
the Troika was very outspoken about the potential 
risks of a cantonment or the DDR process in the cur-
rent political context: “[R]isks [of increasing violence] 
also apply to other areas of work, which could deepen 
exclusion, for example Security Sector Reform and 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. The 
Troika is unable to support work in these areas until 
progress has been made in reducing the violence and 
generating meaningful dialogue”2. The Troika and the 
EU consider a sustainable ceasefire as well as an in-
clusive and meaningful dialogue with the parties to 
the conflict in the context of a new peace initiative a 
precondition for any further donor support to ARCSS, 
which they, like IGAD, still regard as the most viable 
path to peace. And the belief that ARCSS continues to 
be the only game in town is shared by other donors, 
ranging from more traditional ones (like Germany 
and Japan) to non-traditional actors, such as China, 
that insists on IGAD continuing to play a lead role.
2 \  Troika Speech at IGAD summit, June 2017. Document in the posses-
sion of the author. 
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using this strategic advantage to advance its agenda. It 
is hence not astonishing that many of the ongoing dis-
cussions in Juba about force assembly are focusing on 
the cantonment of opposition forces. As a result, the 
Joint Military Ceasefire Commission has been silent 
about the assembly of government troops as prescribed 
by ARCSS. But if the leaders of South Sudan are indeed 
committed to pursuing peace, demilitarization and  
reconciliation, they will need to demonstrate this politi-
cal will to their country and to the world. The TGoNU 
will need to send a strong signal that it is not misusing 
its military dominance. It can do this most effectively  
by moving its forces back to the barracks.
Avoid long-term programmes linked to 
cantonment to disincentivize the emergence of new 
armed groups
If the cantonment process continues to be pushed 
forward, it will need to be planned and implemented 
to provide control and security and not to encourage 
new armed groups to join the fighting in the hope to 
obtain a privileged seat at the negotiations table and 
ultimately the table of power. Though much needed, 
there are clear risks to new peace initiatives like the 
High Level Revitalization Forum as they may offer 
new opportunities and incentives for aspiring warlords 
to engage in fighting. Although JMEC Chairman  
Festus Mogae recently stressed that the new IGAD  
initiative is a revitalization, not a renegotiation  
process, achieving greater inclusion while trying to 
avoid further rebellions will be a difficult task.
One important step to discourage individuals from join-
ing the fighting is to be more transparent about the  
potential benefits ex-combatants are to receive after  
demobilization. This transparency should trigger a  
public discourse about the need to reduce the size of the 
army, restructure it and adapt its role to the current and 
future needs of South Sudan. In a country that fought 
successfully for its independence, where fighters have 
enormous expectations regarding the potential benefits 
they are to receive after having left the armed forces, 
this is admittedly not an easy task but a necessary one. 
While the Strategic Defense and Review (SDSR)  
board was meant to come up with the policies men-
tioned above, little progress has been made in this 
area. Although the SDSR board has become more  
active in recent months, it has yet to submit princi-
pled documents that guide the mid-term transforma-
tion of the country’s security sector (e.g. ethnic inclu-
sion, militia integration and professionalization) to 
the Council of Ministers. These may also serve as  
the basis for further talks with the opposition in the 
context of new peace initiatives such as the High- 
Level Revitalization Forum.
Generate inclusive dialogue about transitional  
security arrangements including non-signatories  
to ARCSS
Any new peace initiative which aims to revive ARCSS 
needs to ensure that opposition movements, includ-
ing those that are not signatories to ARCSS, are ade-
quately represented. They will need to be given a 
chance to freely, safely and actively pursue their  
political goals by peaceful means. As noted by JMEC 
Deputy Chairman Ambassador Njoroge already during 
the November 2016 cantonment workshop, “inclusivity 
means inviting all ‘parties’ to join the cantonment 
and DDR process peacefully, and ensuring genuine 
representation of the national character in all trans-
formed institutions” (UNMISS, 2016) 
While it is hard not to subscribe to this statement, 
there is still great uncertainty about what inclusivity 
really means: According to IGAD, eligible partici-
pants for the Revitalization Forum, for instance, are 
“the parties to the ARCSS including estranged 
groups” (Verjee, 2017)— a very ambiguous term that 
does not spell out which groups will or will not be 
considered part of the new peace process. While one 
would assume that estranged groups also include 
those loyal to Riek Machar, IGAD has not explicitly 
said so (Verjee, 2017). 
All sides need to demonstrate political will to  
assemble their forces
As mentioned above, news reports suggest that the  
TGoNU has gained the upper hand militarily and is 
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Another important tool to disincentivize the emergence 
of new armed groups will be to avoid long-term, costly 
programmes linked to cantonment. While cantonment 
can certainly be a means for registering and verifying 
combatants, it should not aim at sustaining forces in as-
sembly over longer-time periods. 
Lessons learned from other countries moreover show 
that disarmament and demobilization are likely to  
succeed when they commence soon after the cessation 
of hostilities. In South Sudan, too much time was lost in 
the past two years in the identification of potential  
assembly sites and the preparation of eligibility criteria 
for cantonment. If ARCSS can be revived, this mistake 
should not be made again. 
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